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'Any one of us could be among that number': Comparing the policy narratives for individualized 
disability funding in Australia and England.  
Julia Gillard was Australian Prime Minister in 2013 when the National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(NDIS) became law, and the first part of the title of this article is taken from her autobiography 
(Gillard 2015). In it she sets out the principles that underpin the introduction of the NDIS, which 
provides no-fault insurance for all people with permanent and profound disabilities in Australia for 
the first time. The NDIS incorporates an individualized budget allocation to people assessed as being 
eligible for government-funded disability support, replacing a patchwork of state-by-state 
entitlements. This shift has been accompanied by a large-scale increase in funding, as well as a huge 
increase in the political profile given to services for disabled people, and has been broadly 
celebrated by disability rights organizations. Piloting of the NDIS was undertaken in several sites 
across Australia from 2014, and the full national rollout began in July 2016. This shift to person-
centred services for people with disabilities, based on the principles of individualized funding, 
follows similar reforms in other countries (Izuhara 2003; Grit and de Bont 2009; Glasby and 
Dickinson 2009; Alakeson 2010).  
This article compares how far the Australian policy narrative for the NDIS was similar to or different 
from the personalization narrative in English care services. The NDIS is a major new policy initiative, 
and as the first article that considers the NDIS from a comparative perspective, we make an original 
contribution to better understanding its origins and framing. The NDIS is at an early stage of 
implementation, and it is not yet clear what its individual and system-level outcomes will be. 
However a focus on narrative provides insight into the discursive framing that shapes the 
implementation context. The article draws from interviews undertaken in Australia with politicians, 
policy-makers, people using services, providers, disability rights groups and care planners, and 
compares them to existing research about the narrative of personalization in England (Author A 
date). The focus of the article is on people with a disability rather than frail older people; whereas 
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both groups are eligible for personal budgets in the UK under a unified adult social care system, in 
Australia elder care is not part of the NDIS.  
The first part of the article discusses the move to individualized funding in the two countries. 
Following a discussion of research methods, the article then goes on to present data from interviews 
and policy document analysis undertaken in Australia. The analysis draws attention to two core 
storylines in the narrative, which together affirm the population-wide insurance-based principles of 
the NDIS reform, and stand in contrast to the storylines used in the English case. The first is the 'all in 
it together' storyline expressed by Gillard, based on disability as a shared risk, best approached 
through risk pooling. The second is a focus on minimising future liabilities, as a way of making the 
financial case for the large-scale investment underpinning NDIS. These storylines contrast with the 
dominant storylines in England in which attention focuses more on the right to choice and control 
now for a (relatively segregated) minority of the population. We argue that the differences of policy 
narrative can be explained in two ways: first, that NDIS was developed as a major new funding 
initiative requiring public support that had to emphasize its potential benefits for the whole 
population. In this way it is more analogous to the post-war Beveridge reforms of the welfare state 
than it is to England’s personalization agenda for social care. Second, the Australian narrative draws 
on investment approaches, in which current spending draws a return on investment in the future. 
This construction of the person with disabilities in actuarial terms focuses attention on minimising 
the future liabilities of the worker-citizen and risks occluding the lived experience of people with 
disabilities now.  
 
The transition to individualized funding  
In the UK, the Direct Payments Act 1996 marked a significant milestone for disability campaigners 
who had been agitating for many years for a change in the law to make it possible for disabled 
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people to control their care monies. Early take-up of direct payments was low and predominantly 
included people with physical disabilities (Glasby and Littlechild 2016). People with learning 
disabilities have increasingly come to take up the budgets, with added impetus from the more 
conducive policy climate of the broader personalization agenda since 2007, formalized in law as the 
Care Act 2014 (Glasby and Littlechild 2016). In part this is because of the development of alternative 
funding arrangements such as managed personal budgets (where people can be involved in 
spending choices but the money remains with the local authority) and individual service funds where 
monies can be held by a third party. Levels of take up of personal budgets stand at 88 percent of 
people with disabilities aged under 65, with 42 per cent of these taking the money as a direct 
payment (NAO 2016).  
In Australia, disability services have been predominantly block-funded (Purcal et al. 2014: 89). A high 
profile report into the viability of the proposed NDIS by the Australian Government Productivity 
Commission (AGPC) (2011) concluded that, ‘the current disability support system is underfunded, 
unfair, fragmented, and inefficient. It gives people with a disability little choice, no certainty of 
access to appropriate supports and little scope to participate in the community’ (AGPC 2011: 3). 
Indeed, a few years prior to the Productivity Commission’s report an OECD study found that 
Australia was the worst performer of all 27 nations in terms of poverty levels for people with 
disability (OECD 2009). Australia’s ‘wage earners’ welfare state left people with a disability 
‘vulnerable to poverty, reliant on meagre, fragmentary welfare services or more often on private 
charity’ (Deeming 2013: 670).  
The Productivity Commission report set out a new approach to funding care services, signalling a 
major new federal commitment to fund and oversee disability services, which had previously been 
held at the state government level. As well as greater investment in early intervention and 
community-based support for people with low support needs, individualized packages of funding 
would be available for people with higher support needs. As Purcal et al. (2014) point out, prior to 
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this there had been some limited state schemes to allow individualized funding: what was new 
about the NDIS was the funded federal commitment to make such access available across the 
country (AGPC 2011). Also new was the high-profile political will behind it, which survived the 
change of government from Labour to Liberal-dominated coalition in 2014 with little change. The 
federal government committed to provide $22 billion to roll the scheme out across the country, 
funded in part through an increase in the Medicare levy (a tax paid by Australian residents for access 
to the public health system, currently approximately 2% of taxable income).  
It can be argued that a shared personalization narrative is emerging, across countries, which is that 
disability services should be person-centred, offering choice and control through individualized 
funding (Glasby and Dickinson 2009; Foster et al. 2012; Power 2014). Approaching personalization as 
a narrative draws attention to its role as a story about how services can and should change (and are 
changing) that itself draws on a range of storylines (sub-narratives) to assure its plausibility and 
authenticity (Author A, date). As is well-rehearsed in existing writings on personalization, 
individualized funding has in part become so widely popular because it knits together two dominant 
policy trends in advanced democracies: neoliberal public sector reform that seeks to strip power 
away from large government bureaucracies and human rights discourses that aim to maximise the 
scope for self-actualization amongst people who have been denied full citizenship in the past 
(Rummery 2006; Purcal et al. 2014: 89; Glasby and Littlechild 2016).  
The tensions between these two strands has surfaced in the UK in debates over the degree to which 
person-centredness and individualized funding aim to develop consumer rights or citizen rights 
(Scourfield 2007; Ferguson 2008; Power 2014). Consumer rights are typically conceived as being 
concerned with affording people with disabilities the right to make individual choices within a free 
market. This is arguably a version of ‘shallow’ personalization as defined by Leadbeater (2004). 
People with disabilities are able to purchase services, which allow for modest customization and 
adaption to their needs, but without a transformation of the power balance between individuals 
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with disabilities, communities and the state. Citizen rights – associated with ‘deep’ personalization 
(Leadbeater 2004) – are also concerned within individual freedom, but in this case in relation to 
democratic values and inclusion in society. They go beyond customising services to giving people 
with disabilities a greater role and greater responsibilities in designing solutions (Rummery, 2006). 
Leadbeater (2004) argues that most public service systems are able to accommodate greater 
consumer rights through some minor work to existing systems, but to achieve citizen rights involves 
more than just a change to practices of service delivery – it requires a shift in power so that design 
and control of services becomes bottom-up rather than top-down.  
In a recent study, Christensen and Pilling (2014) use the distinction between consumer and citizen 
rights to compare the introduction of personalization policies in two different ‘welfare regimes’ 
(Esping-Andersen 1990): England and Norway. Drawing primarily on national policy documents, they 
conclude that there are substantial differences between the versions of personalization in the two 
jurisdictions and that this has implications for the ability of individuals to express consumer and/or 
citizen rights. They identify a discourse of democracy and citizen rights around individualized care 
funding in Norway, compared to a consumer-oriented market model in England (2014: 493). They 
suggest that this difference maps onto the social democratic versus the liberal welfare regime.  
In focusing on Australia and the UK we encounter two states that have usually been seen as 
belonging to the same ‘liberal’ welfare regime (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2009) – although the 
classic Esping-Andersen (1990) three worlds typology was challenged by Castles and Mitchell (1993) 
who suggested Australia belonged to a fourth ‘radical’ category of welfare capitalism. This radical 
category  - which Castles and Mitchell suggest also contained the UK until 1980 – takes account of 
the use of labour relations to increase equality. Whilst acknowledging the different labour relations 
practices in Australia and the UK, we argue that these constitute similar welfare regimes (unlike the 
Norway/England comparison), and that attention to the narrative framings of care policies can 
uncover differences within regime types as well as between them . We separate out the broad 
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narrative of personalization or person-centred care – shared across many developed countries – 
from the distinctive storylines (sub-narratives) that explain and justify that narrative within 
particular settings. In doing so we offer an original contribution to better understanding why NDIS 
took its current form and which strands of the narrative will be in tension as full national 
implementation begins.  
 
Understanding individualized funding schemes through a narrative approach  
Approaching policy as narrative and storylines is to draw on the work of interpretive policy theorists 
such as Hajer (1993, 2005), Yanow (e.g. 1996) and Wagenaar (2011). The starting point for 
interpretive policy studies is that they focus on ‘meanings that shape actions and institutions, and 
the ways in which they do so’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2004: 130). Implicit in this statement is the idea that 
meaning is crucial in the study of policy and not simply in terms of the sentiments that different 
actors might hold in relation to particular issues. Meaning shapes everything that we do and has 
proved to be particularly important in studying the implementation of policy where there may be 
multiple understandings of policies and policy language (Yanow 1996). By providing an 
understanding of the different possible meanings of personalized care funding we can better 
understand the dynamic tensions inherent in the system as actors seek to make a reality of a broad 
set of policy intentions.    
In his influential work on environmental policy change, Hajer argues for the transformative role of 
storylines that ‘suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a 
problem…’ (Hajer 2005: 56). Once expressed and endorsed, storylines provide a point of reference, a 
heuristic, so that people need to make reference only to the storyline not to the complex bundle of 
arguments that underpin it, and make sense of new information and ideas by fitting them into the 
storyline (Fischer 2003: 124). Beyond their roots in domains such as the environment and planning, 
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Hajer, Fischer and others have argued for the relevance of these ideas across public policy (Fischer 
2003; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2015).  
Differences in the framing and design of person-centred approaches are what we call the storylines 
that fall beneath the broad personalization narrative. We compare the emergence of the NDIS in 
Australia with personal budgets in England, comparing the underlying storylines that prompted and 
legitimized change in the two countries, and how those stories impact on how policy is 
implemented. Empirical work in the UK was conducted by Author A for a prior study, drawing on 
national policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews with 80 people involved in 
different aspects of the social care system (policy makers, service managers, providers and users). A 
fuller discussion of the methods and evidence is available in Author A (date). This prior study focused 
on identifying the storylines that had built support for personalization, leading to its adoption as a 
central approach to the reform of adult social care services. Five storylines were identified: 
personalization works; it saves money; it recognizes that people are experts on their own lives; it 
reflects how people live their lives rather than service jurisdictions; and it is applicable beyond social 
care, as other services can be made person-centred. The first of these - personalization works - is 
activated through vignettes of how people have used personal budgets to improve their lives. The 
second, on saving money, assumes that supply will better match demand as individuals make their 
own care choices, reducing waste within the system. The third is a rights-based appeal, affirming the 
inherent rights of people with disabilities to have choice and control, and not to cede power to 
professionals and institutions as in the past. The fourth storyline rejects segregated, service-led 
approaches to disability and argues for inclusive support through which people can get ‘a life not a 
service’ (In Control 2015). The fifth storyline explains the scope for individualized funding to provide 
benefits in a wider range of public services.  
What is significant in these storylines is that they all assume a group of people with disabilities who 
are currently excluded from mainstream society (and should have better access). Only storyline five 
8 
 
is about the relevance of the policy for the broader citizenry, and here the claim relates to the ability 
to harness the benefits of individualized budgets in non-disability services. Across the five storylines, 
aspects of citizenship and consumerism are intertwined – there is an emphasis on customized 
services as well as rights and inclusion - suggesting that the policy is aimed at a hybrid citizen-
consumer (Clarke et al. 2007).  
This work made a significant contribution to theorising personalization, through separating out the 
different storylines within it, and rejecting the simplistic binary of citizen versus consumer. In the 
rest of the article we look at how the storylines that are emerging in Australia compare to these 
English storylines. We highlight contrasts in who the policy is designed for (people with existing 
disabilities versus the whole population), the temporal scope of the transformation (now versus the 
future) and the framing of the individual (citizen-consumer verses future worker-citizen).  
 
Methods  
The storylines of the NDIS in Australia were assembled from analysis of policy documents and semi-
structured interviews. The combination of policy documents and interviews helped to develop a 
fuller picture of the reforms than would be possible through each source alone. Federal policy 
documents relating to the NDIS, along with sources such as the memoires of politicians with a 
known involvement in the development of the NDIS, were used as the basis for developing an initial 
understanding and timeline for the NDIS reforms. These documents were also used to identify the 
emergent storylines that justified and explained the policy. They were further drawn on to identify 
federal and state politicians, bureaucrats and disability campaigners with a role in the development 
of the NDIS who were contacted by email and asked for an interview. A snowballing approach was 
then used to identify interviewees who had been involved in the development of the NDIS policy or 
were working on translating the policy into a new approach in the pilot sites. A total of 23 people 
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were interviewed, all during 2015. As shown in Table 1, this included disability campaigners, support 
planners and advocates, training providers, service providers and their representative organization, 
federal and state bureaucrats and federal politicians. It was a purposive sample, aiming to interview 
a range of key stakeholders who played a role in the development of the NDIS, or in disability 
services more broadly. Several of these were people with a disability. Individuals were selected 
either because they were named individuals who had been associated with the NDIS, or because 
they play a particular role in an organization or institution that had a high profile role in the NDIS. 
Although the sample is small, it is a cross-section of key stakeholders at an early/important stage in 
the implementation of such a fundamental policy, offering a broader range of perspectives than are 
evident in other writings about NDIS to date. We reached saturation point in the two dominant 
storylines of the NDIS that were being articulated, affirming the validity of the analysis presented 
below (Morse 2002).  
[Table 1 – here] 
 
Ethical approval for the project was provided by the University of Melbourne's Research Ethics 
Committee (HREC no 1545005.1). Participants were given an information sheet in advance of taking 
part, and notified that they could ask to withdraw from the research at any time. Interviews were 
either face-to-face or over the telephone, based on interviewee preference. The interviews were 
semi-structured with open-ended questions, asking interviewees about their own involvement with 
the NDIS, what had triggered the reform, and what the experience of early implementation was 
showing to date. Interviews were audio-recorded with the participants' consent, on the 
understanding that quotes would be anonymized. Quotes used below are given identifier codes 
rather than names.  
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The policy documents and interview transcripts were analysed to draw out emerging storylines 
around the introduction of the NDIS. We used inductive coding to develop themes and sub-themes 
through the extraction of salient, recurring or significant claims within the policy documents and 
interview transcripts (Attride-Stirling 2001). For example ‘insurance’ was a theme that emerged 
strongly from the policy documents and interviews, and we developed sub-themes to understand 
what people meant when they talked about the insurance aspects of the scheme. Coding was 
undertaken by extracting relevant sentences and paragraphs from the documents and assembling 
themed tables of coded text in Microsoft Word. The coding was done by one of the authors and then 
checked by the other author to enhance validity and reliability. Our approach to data analysis was 
both inductive and iterative (Feldman et al. 2004). As with Hazenberg and Hall (2015), we did not 
‘test’ any pre-determined set of hypotheses or choose a model a priori, but instead used the data to 
identify the storylines. A final phase of coding identified quotes for inclusion in written outputs on 
the basis that they were indicative of one of the two storylines.  
 
The Australian storylines 
England and Australia are both devolving some financial control for disability services to the 
individual, expressed in a dominant policy narrative of person-centredness. However the policy 
storylines underpinning this broad narrative have been very different in the two countries. In 
England, as set out above, the key focus of its personalization reforms has been more choice and 
control for individuals with existing disabilities on the basis that people should have that as a right, 
and that choice will lead to better, more efficient provision of support (Glasby and Littlechild 2016). 
In Australia personalised funding has been explained and justified through a narrative of insurance, 
expressed as two storylines: first, risk of disability is something that all Australians share, and risk-
pooling is the best way to respond to that risk; second, early intervention and strong actuarial 
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involvement will secure the financial future of individualized funding. These are summarised in Table 
2. We consider them in more detail in the sections that follow.  
[Table 2 here] 
 
Storyline 1: Insurance as risk-pooling  
A distinctive feature of the Australian approach has been its inclusivity. As the Productivity 
Commission report puts it, 'In one sense, the NDIS is for all Australians, since it would 
provide insurance against the costs of support in the event that they, or a family member, 
acquire a significant disability' (AGPC 2011: 10). The Every Australian Counts campaign that 
advocated for the new funding scheme was a broad-based movement that harnessed public 
support for the NDIS through media campaigns and targeting of key politicians to make a 
public commitment to the proposed new system (Steketee 2013). The campaign's title was 
expressive of its key message: that people with disabilities should be treated as full citizens, 
a message that resonates with the English narrative. However the Australian approach drew 
on something else: an appeal to universality and risk assurance, which was not evident in the 
English case. As Darcy (2015) puts it, 'Australian taxpayers are investing heavily in the 
potential of people with disability...They are also investing in their own peace of mind. If 
they or their family members ever have a disability, they will not have to endure the 
indignity that many people with disability have to go through every day of their life to try 
and have the essentials they need to live the life they want.’   
This notion of ‘peace of mind’ was a sub-theme, under the broader storyline of risk-pooling. 
One of the interviewees involved in the Every Australian Counts campaign (and now a 
planner supporting people with individual packages) expressed how the campaign framed its 
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appeal in terms of everyone needing to have the reassurance that disability support was 
available:  
“The Every Australian Counts campaign did a really good job of explaining to 
ordinary Australians that disability can affect anybody at any time. Ordinary 
Australians started to realise this isn’t about those folks over there, this is about me. I 
could have a disability myself or have a grandchild born with a disability or fall off a 
ladder tomorrow cleaning out the gutters. Every Australian started to realise 
disability was something they needed to think about” (Support planner, #17).  
There was here then a commitment to the NDIS as having a relevance for broader 
populations who are ‘at risk’, even if not using services themselves currently.  
Another sub-theme within this storyline related to equity and the need to ensure that 
people who were born with disabilities had access to services in a way that was comparable 
with acquired injuries. The model for the NDIS is drawn from existing no-fault motor 
insurance and workplace compensation schemes in Australia – and similar schemes in New 
Zealand – and a sense that the absence of similar cover for people with disabilities acquired 
in other ways was unfair (AGPC 2011; Foster et al. 2012). Under the existing system those 
born with a disability were not eligible for support for many services, while those who 
acquired injury through work or a motor accident would be, illustrating a clear equity issue. 
During the 1980s, the Deputy Prime Minister and Disability Minister Brian Howe, first 
articulated the need to develop an insurance-based disability scheme to bring disability 
support into line with accident compensation and 'shake off an approach to disability which 
has about it a whiff of charity' (Howe and Burbadge 2005: 3). This same strand is articulated 
by Prime Minister Julia Gillard, who led the government that introduced the NDIS:  
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The case in essence was a simple one. Someone who acquired a disability through a 
motor vehicle or at work would be covered by one of the state-based public 
insurance schemes. That person would have options and choices about their care. 
The insurance scheme would meet the costs of all necessary reasonable support. 
People in these schemes would not be told things like, The only time someone can 
come to assist you to shower and dress is late in the afternoon, a couple of times a 
week. Or, Sorry, but there is no more funding and you have missed out on the care 
you need. Yet people born with a disability or who acquired it during their life in 
circumstances where there was no insurer, frequently heard such disheartening 
words (Gillard 2015: 416, emphasis in the original).  
In the interviews, a senior bureaucrat involved in the development of the NDIS told us, 
“Brian [Howe] said to me stop thinking about this as a welfare model and start thinking 
about it as risk and insurance. That took me on a journey where I started to explore 
insurance approaches to supporting people with a disability” (Federal bureaucrat, #15). A 
number of interviewees talked of the New Zealand insurance-based scheme run by the 
Accident Compensation Corporation as the inspiration for the NDIS. 
 
Storyline 2. Insurance as a way to minimize future liabilities  
The second storyline of insurance that was drawn on in constructing a narrative for NDIS 
focused on its commitment to minimising future liabilities. As Baker explains (2012: 5):  
The [Productivity] Commission also listed potential efficiency gains - for example, 
every 1 per cent increase in productivity in the disability sector could lower the 
scheme’s costs by $130 million. Further benefits could come through reduced bed 
blocking in public hospitals; fewer people with an intellectual or psychiatric disability 
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in prisons; and increased economic participation by people with disability, 
particularly those receiving the Disability Support Pension (DSP). The combination of 
these benefits would give the NDIS a net economic cost (not budgetary) of $1.6 
billion and would only have to produce a gain of $3,800 per participant to meet a 
cost-benefit test.  
In achieving this goal, insurance-based schemes were compared favourably with what 
interviewees framed as existing ‘welfare’ based approaches, meaning a scheme without 
actuarial underwriting, because of an assumption that the latter are too crisis-oriented:  
[W]hen faced with budget constraints, systems have little choice but to give priority 
to families in crisis. This displaces funds for early intervention and respite programs, 
increasing further the number of families falling into crisis, and leading to an on 
going causal relationship between shortages and crises (AGPC 2011: 5).  
This recurrent rejection of welfare was one of the sub-themes of this storyline. Welfare 
systems were assumed to perform poorly on investment in recovery, compared to 
insurance-based schemes. As one interviewee put it, “I looked at the way in which accident 
compensation schemes get people back to work and have a focus on recovery and 
opportunity, which are not so characteristic of the welfare scheme models” (Federal 
bureaucrat, #15).  
The insurance model was also assumed by this interviewee to deliver much better long-term 
financial management, when compared to a welfare-based system:  
“But because it is an insurance scheme we are trying to minimize the cost of 
supporting someone over their lifetime. That means that we are trying to make 
investment decisions that maximize life outcomes in terms of independence and 
participation. That is fundamentally different to welfare schemes where you often 
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get caught up in the immediacy of annual funding targets and inevitably make 
decisions which are suboptimal in the long-term” (Federal bureaucrat, #15). 
This theme of distancing the NDIS from a discredited welfare approach is echoed in the 
National Disability Insurance Agency’s (NDIA) Strategic Plan: 'There is therefore a much 
closer alignment of interests between people with a disability, their families and carers and 
the NDIS, compared with the previous welfare-based approach to disability support services' 
(NDIA 2013: 10).  
Actuaries were to play a key role in ensuring that NDIS achieved its goal of minimising 
liabilities, emphasising the importance of data analysis as one of the sub-themes of this 
storyline (Foster et al. 2012). As one interviewee said:  
“We are gathering more data than anywhere in the world. So the population and 
time series data – our ability to undertake really good research and test it across 
databases is second to none...we are constantly looking at the forecasts and the 
actual results – why are we getting a higher number of people with a particular 
condition in the scheme than we would have expected or a lower number, why are 
the costs higher or lower, why are the outcomes better or worse for a particular 
cohort with a particular service. So the actuarial approach will drive effectiveness 
and efficiency over time” (Federal bureaucrat, #15).  
The prominent role given to actuaries led to tensions in the appointment of the NDIA Board 
between those with an experience of insurance schemes and those with a background in 
disability services or a personal experience of disability. Whereas the board initially favoured 
people with disability experience, the then Social Security Minister Mitch Fyfield (2013-15) 
pushed for a shake-up of the board to bring in insurance experts instead. Justifying these 
changes, Fyfield said: 'As we move to the next stage of implementation of the NDIS – the 
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transition to full scheme – the NDIA will require a Board with a highly specialized skill set to 
effectively manage a rapid increase in participants, from 30,000 to 460,000 over three years, 
and administer a $22 billion insurance-based scheme' (Smerdon 2015).  
One of the key principles of the NDIS is early intervention, another sub-theme of this 
storyline. Only around 10 per cent of people with disabilities – those with permanent and 
profound disabilities – will be able to access individual support packages. Other people will 
be directed into lower-level preventive services in the community, as part of the 
Information, Linkages and Capacity-Building strand of NDIS (NDIA 2015). As one bureaucrat 
put it, “To understand the NDIS you need to understand that key point – early intervention 
becomes a logical investment, it introduces long-term benefits” (Federal bureaucrat, #15). 
The interviewee goes on, “If someone has equipment that gives them greater mobility and 
can participate socially and economically or reduces the number of carers you need because 
it is self-operated or operated by one person rather than two, the payback on that is just 
enormous” (Federal bureaucrat, #15). According to another senior bureaucrat: “What 
government was looking for was insurance and what they meant by that was a system that 
rigorously managed costs, a system that knew how to get the benefits of early intervention” 
(Federal bureaucrat, #23).  
Not all interviewees were positive about the prominence given to cost-savings. One 
interviewee expressed her frustration with the continued focus on the economic gains of the 
scheme: “The actuarial model shouldn’t just be about the economic viability, it should be 
about the amazing difference you can make in people's lives if you get in there early” 
(Support planner, #17). As Darcy (2015) put it: ‘the NDIS is not just an “insurance scheme” 
requiring knowledge of the insurance business. Rather, the NDIS is a social policy reform 
including the National Disability Strategy that, at its heart, requires an understanding of the 
lived experience of people with disability.’  
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Such comments highlight a tension between the insurance approach and a rights-based 
approach to disability, inspired by a vision of equal citizenship and informed by a lived 
experience of disability. The contrast between insurance and rights was another sub-theme 
of this storyline. Although rights were mentioned by interviewees, they appeared to be 
secondary to the insurance focus. As one senior bureaucrat put it, “It came together quite 
nicely with the human rights model, because to invest in individuals and monitor their costs 
you had to have individualized funding. So insurance was about the cost containment side 
and the efficiency side” (Federal bureaucrat, #23). In other words, the human rights aspect 
was a side-benefit of the insurance approach, not the core focus of the reforms. One of the 
former Federal ministers we spoke to, when asked about the rationale for individualizing the 
funding, said:  
“Looking back now I can see what a significant change it is but it wasn’t a huge part 
of either the intellectual argument or the campaign or the debate internally to get 
the money...I know the end result is individualized thinking but that came more out 
of thinking what is going to be good for you over your life, rather than [the] history in 
the UK of individualized funding being the core thing” (Federal politician, #2).  
The lack of attention to the human rights element in the system design was a concern to 
interviewees working in the disability sector. As one put it, “At the heart we have a real disconnect. 
There is a need for the insurance approach to have much more of a human rights framework” 
(Training provider, #10). 
 
Individual budgets as social investment  
The Australian commitment to insurance (not ‘welfare’) through risk pooling and early intervention 
as a cost-recovery approach, locates the NDIS within a set of policy storylines that differ from those 
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that accompanied the implementation of personal budgets in England. The Every Australian Counts 
campaign needed to assure mass support for the NDIS to legitimate the fiscal commitments that the 
reform entailed. In this way it may be that the NDIS is more analogous to a foundational shift such as 
the 1942 Beveridge report in the UK, and the subsequent establishment of the post-war welfare 
state. Beveridge, like the NDIS, was translated into a welfare programme in part through a popular 
campaign in which there was a shared appeal to everyone on a common insurance basis (Cole 1942). 
As Beresford puts it ‘Beveridge’s plans for social renewal captured people’s imagination. It can be 
difficult not to appreciate the resonance his 300-page report had’ (2016: 710). Like the NDIS, the 
Beveridge report (1942) emphasized the importance of protecting people from ‘predictable risks’ 
that all may face and against which they should be insured.  
The focus on early intervention as a way of minimising future liabilities suggests that the Australian 
approach can be located within the social investment approach that was evident in other welfare 
reforms under the 2007-13 Labor government (Smyth and Deeming 2016) and persisted under the 
Liberal government (McClure 2015). The emergence of a social investment state has been observed 
in many developed welfare systems (Giddens 1998; Morel et al. 2012), although it has taken 
divergent forms (Deeming and Smyth 2015; Smyth and Deeming 2016). The language of investment 
features heavily in the Productivity Commission’s report on NDIS (2011), and the design of the 
system encompasses the features that Lister identities as core to a social investment approach, 
including: investment in human and social capital; a focus on the future; an attempt to adapt 
individuals to the knowledge economy in order to enhance global competitiveness; an integration of 
economic and social policy (Lister, 2003).  
The location of the NDIS within a social investment approach places it in a different standing vis-a-vis 
the individual than in the English case. In the UK, activation policies to bring more people into the 
workplace have been a key part of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) agenda for two 
decades, and have included a more recent focus on people with disabilities (Garthwaite 2011; 
19 
 
Grover and Piggott 2013). However those DWP initiatives have been kept discursively separate from 
the Department of Health-led policy of person-centred care and personal budgets (Author A, date). 
In relation to personalization, it is debates about whether the reforms privilege the citizen or the 
consumer that have been most prevalent, as set out above. The tension in social investment 
approaches is different, taking on a temporal distinction between the current and future citizen 
(Lister 2003, 2004; Newman and McKee 2005). As Lister puts it, ‘It is the future worker-citizen more 
than democratic-citizen who is the prime asset of the social-investment state’ (2003: 433). Social 
investment approaches have also been criticized for being less inclusive than the social protection 
policies that they have replaced (Deeming and Smyth 2015: 314). When entitlement for support is 
premised on satisfying actuarial thresholds about future liabilities, there is a risk that those who 
cannot pay-back as future citizen-workers struggle to make a legitimate claim to the state for their 
support (Deeming and Smyth 2015: 314).  
Lister, writing about social investment approaches targeted at children, welcomes the additional, 
targeted funding that social investment approaches offer, but is wary about the ways in which 
potential future gains slide attention away from contemporary inequalities. She warns:  
the future orientation and discourses of the social investment state encourage not just the 
elision of demands for equality in the here-and-now, but also, paradoxically, the partial 
disappearance of childhood and of the child qua child, including the child as a rights-bearer 
(under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) (Lister 2003: 433).  
In a parallel way, it can be argued that the actuarial approach of the NDIS potentially shifts attention 
away from the lived experience of people with disabilities now, and from the intrinsic defence of 
disability rights that are embodied in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
The future orientation of the NDIS was evident in this observation from one of our interviewees:  
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“This scheme will work best for babies who are being born with a disability today and people 
who are acquiring a disability today because they are not bringing any old baggage. They are 
not trying to shift from the old world to the new world. Families are struggling with how do I 
dream of a new life or a different life for myself because the last forty years with a disability I 
was told don’t have any dreams because I will never achieve any of them” (Care Coordinator, 
#17).  
This anxiety about whether or not the NDIS will improve the experiences of existing adults with 
disabilities has been a theme expressed by disability organisations during the piloting phase of NDIS 
(Purcal et al. 2016). There have been concerns that people were not taking up the opportunity of 
greater choice and control to opt for something different than they had in the past, or indeed to be 
more connected into low-level community services. Several interviewees expressed concerns that 
people did not have the skills or knowledge to make different choices about what to spend their 
packages on: “You’ve really got to have advocacy skills if it is something out of the box and it is a bit 
different from existing services…It is a battle most of the time” (Service provider, #7) Another used 
Plato’s allegory of the cave: “Do you remember the cave when people only saw the reflection of the 
light? There are people who are still living in that cave, including planners, they don’t know what life 
can be…There are people in the community but who are locked in their own house with little idea of 
what they can access” (Training provider, #11). A Citizens’ Jury on the NDIS concluded: 'The plans for 
most participants appeared to emphasize funded supports with existing disability providers, with 
little evidence of participants being connected to mainstream services' (People with Disability 
Australia 2015: 46). There are concerns that people are being steered people towards existing (‘in-
kind’) service to avoid the double running costs of sustaining existing service contracts alongside 
new individualised packages, exemplified in the My First Plan initiative that appears to limit 
participants’ scope for individual planning and goal-setting (Every Australian Counts 2016).  
Conclusion 
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Person-centred approaches to care, including individualized funding, are established as key 
principles in the disability sectors of the UK and Australia and are seen as crucial in affording 
individuals with disabilities more choice and control over directing their care. Comparing the 
narratives of person-centred care at work in the disability reforms being implemented in both 
countries, we found considerable differences in terms of the storylines around the development of 
these policies. In this article we have argued that one of the major differences between these 
countries is the focus in Australia on an insurance mechanism with pooled risk that is applicable to 
the entire population, rather than an issue of choice and control for a small proportion of the 
population as we find in the English example. Whereas the English policy design has been argued to 
counterpoise a voucher-wielding consumer against a rights-bearing citizen, we have argued that the 
Australian design positions the person with a disability now against the future worker-citizen.  
Our research is based on a small number of interviews, and at an early stage in the piloting of the 
NDIS. Now that the policy has moved to the national implementation phase, large scale evaluations 
are underway (e.g. http://ndisevaluation.net.au), and will help to trace the extent to which disabled 
people are getting better outcomes as a result of a better-funded and more individualized approach 
to budgeting. However, the experience of the UK suggests that such evaluations will not close down 
debates about whether disability services are undergoing deep, transformative changes that 
enhance people’s rights, or more shallow consumerist shifts. The changes within disability services 
are located within broader shifts in welfare regimes that are towards the residualisation of state 
welfare (Deeming, 2016). In the case of Australia, the benefits of its social investment approach will 
not be evident for many years, raising questions about the commitment to transforming care 
services for people currently using them.  
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